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Abstract. Attacks on trust and reputation systems (TRS) as well as de-
fense strategies against certain attacks are the subject of many research
papers. Although proposing valuable ideas, they all exhibit at least one
of the following major shortcomings. Firstly, many researchers design de-
fense mechanisms from scratch and without reusing approved ideas. Sec-
ondly, most proposals are limited to naming and theoretically describing
the defense mechanisms. Another issue is the inconsistent denomination
of attacks with similar characteristics among different researchers. To
address these shortcomings, we propose a novel taxonomy of attacks on
TRS focusing on their general characteristics and symptomatology. We
use this taxonomy to assign reusable, clearly described and practically
implemented components to different classes of attacks. With this work,
we aim to provide a basis for TRS designers to experiment with numerous
defense mechanisms and to build more robust systems in the end.
Keywords: Trust, online reputation, reputation systems, attacks, tax-
onomy, components, reusability
1 Introduction
Electronic marketplaces like eBay and Amazon have greatly facilitated transac-
tion processes between entities on the Internet. This provides many benefits but
at the same time also poses significant challenges. One of the fundamental prob-
lems in electronic marketplaces is that, unlike in traditional face-to-face transac-
tions, buyers do neither get a complete picture of a product’s actual quality nor
do they know about the trustworthiness of the particular seller. To address this,
trust and reputation systems (TRS) have become important elements for the
decision making process in this mostly anonymous environment. According to a
recent study carried out by Diekmann et al. [2], sellers with better reputation are
able to obtain higher prices and an increased number of sales. On the one hand,
this can encourage good behavior because users seek good reputation to benefit
from it. But on the other hand, TRS are likely to face an increasing amount of
attacks by malicious users who try to gain unfair advantages by manipulating
the reputation system through specific behavior [6]. Therefore, it is fundamental
for the providers to use TRS that are robust against all kinds of attacks that
could lead to deceptive reputation scores and trust.
In order to be able to cover every possible attack scenario, we firstly develop
a taxonomy of attacks in electronic marketplaces. On the highest level, we distin-
guish between attacks performed as a seller (seller attacks) and attacks carried
out in the role of the buyer (advisor attacks). Then, we identify defense mecha-
nisms for different types of attacks by assigning reusable TRS components that
can be employed to extend the functionality of the computation engine. These
components are provided in the form of both a conceptual description and fully
implemented reusable web-services in the component repository1 introduced by
Sa¨nger and Pernul [10]. The additional attack view on TRS components consti-
tutes an important extension to the yet largely functional view. We argue that
the assignment of TRS components to attack types not only supports the devel-
opment of more reliable and robust TRS with already existing components but
also helps to identify weaknesses that have not been addressed so far.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Firstly, we give an
overview of the general problem context of our work in Section 2. Thereby we de-
lineate the research gap we discovered and define the objectives of our proposal.
In Section 3, we introduce our novel taxonomy of attack types on TRS. We use
this taxonomy in Section 4 to assign TRS components to the different classes of
attacks. At the same time, we point out how the outcomes of this allocation are
described in clearly structured attack profiles and integrated in the knowledge
repository. In Section 5, we discuss our findings before we conclude in Section 6.
2 Problem Context and Related Work
As opposed to traditional face-to-face interactions, the “universe of strangers” [1]
found in electronic marketplaces makes it hard to determine the trustworthiness
of an actor. This is due to insufficient information as entities commonly never
have transacted with each other before. The problems resulting from the lack of
information can be mitigated through TRS, which have become a widely adapted
element for the decision making process in online environments. To establish a
common understanding, we firstly point out related work on attacks on TRS.
After that, we briefly describe the reusable TRS repository whose components
we map against our attack classes. This leads us to the research gap we address
in this paper.
2.1 Attacks on Trust and Reputation Systems
TRS can be subject to attacks by their participating entities in various ways.
Attacks may be dependent on the specific application scenario, influenced by
the social environment underlying the reputation system, and performed by one
1 http://trust.bayforsec.de/
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single entity or by several colluding entities. Because of the increasing atten-
tion paid to attacks against TRS, several security analyses were carried out in
recent years [3, 4, 6, 13]. The resulting proposals of attack taxonomies and for-
mulations of challenges for robust TRS in turn motivated studies on defense
strategies (for related surveys see [5] and [8]). As the various trust models are
specifically designed to cope with certain attacks, they are not completely robust
against various attacks in different settings. Therefore, security and robustness
still remain the key challenges in the design and development of TRS.
2.2 Reusable Component Repository
Since most of the TRS described in literature use computation methods that are
entirely built from scratch [12], well-established approaches are rarely considered.
To foster reusability, Sa¨nger and Pernul [10] proposed a hierarchical component
taxonomy of computation engines along with a repository containing design
knowledge both on a conceptual and an implementation level. On the conceptual
level, they described each building block as a design pattern-like solution. On the
implementation level, they provided fully implemented reusable components by
means of web-services. The classes of the component repository were the result
of the analysis of their generic process of reputation systems as well as various
computation methods described in different surveys [7, 9, 11–13].
2.3 Research Gap
Apart from the component repository described before, further important steps
toward reusability were made by Hoffman et al. [5] and Koutrouli and Tsalgati-
dou [8]. They conducted surveys on attacks and defense mechanisms and thus
helped to collect the ideas for the research community. The main shortcoming
of these surveys is that they are limited to naming and theoretically describing
the defense mechanisms.
In this paper, we want to go one step further and employ the reusable com-
putation components described by Sa¨nger and Pernul [10] as defense mecha-
nisms for attacks on TRS. The uniform format of their design pattern-like arti-
facts helps to establish clear guidelines for developing new defense mechanisms.
Moreover, their fully implemented components by means of web-services allow
researchers to experiment.
In a preparatory step, we aim to extend their repository by an attack view
in which we systematically describe attack types with certain characteristics
instead of basing the discussions on particular examples of attacks. While this
helps to avoid the yet inconsistent denominations of some attacks (e.g. re-entry
vs. whitewashing), it also makes our remarks more generic and extendable. Most
importantly, we are then able to assign reusable computation components to
entire classes of attacks instead of matching the same defense methods against
numerous examples of attacks.
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3 Taxonomy of Attacks on Trust and Reputation Systems
In this section, we introduce a novel attack taxonomy for electronic marketplaces
in order to organize possible kinds of attacks. On the highest level, we distinguish
between seller attacks and advisor attacks. In these major classes, we classify
every attack type along two dimensions: attackers and behavior.
3.1 Seller Attacks vs. Advisor Attacks
In a common electronic marketplace, we have two parties: the buyer and the
seller. In terms of TRS, both can take the role of the ratee (the one being rated,
usually the seller) and the advisor (the one who provides a referral, usually the
buyer).
To decide which seller to transact with, buyers rely on ratings of other buyers
to evaluate the reputation of sellers. A seller that delivers an item as specified
in the contract is referred to as an honest seller, whereas a seller that does not
deliver an item as specified in the contract is called a dishonest or malicious seller.
Note that the term “item” includes both physical and non-physical products as
well as services. Seller attacks denote manipulations of the reputation system
that one or more entities of an electronic marketplace perform in the role of the
seller. The intention behind these manipulations is to be able to act as a malicious
seller while maintaining a reputation profile that buyers would assess as honest.
Even though cheating behavior from dishonest sellers (e.g. not delivering an item
at all) can be sentenced by law, TRS should aim to prevent these actions from
the first.
Advisor attacks, in contrast, are implemented by the rating parties. Since
buyers can usually rate a seller’s performance in a particular transaction, they
are able to shape his reputation profile and thus act as advisors for other buyers.
According to Jøsang and Golbeck [6], advisor attacks can be summarized under
the term “unfair rating attacks” because they are based on one or several digital
identities providing unfair ratings to other digital identities. These unfair ratings
are used to manipulate the reputation profile of sellers – either boosting or
vilifying it to an unjustified extent. As opposed to seller attacks, advisor attacks
can generally not be sentenced by law.
3.2 Dimensions: Attackers and Behavior
Within the classes of seller and advisor attacks, our taxonomy systematizes at-
tack types along the two dimensions: attackers and behavior.
Attackers The attackers dimension refers to the number and characteristics
of the digital identities participating in an attack. Although seller attacks are
typically performed by one single digital identity, some of them may also be
performed by a colluding group of attackers. Depending on the trust model and
identity management concept used by the reputation system, attackers may also
create additional digital identities on their own in order to boost their leverage.
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– One identity: An attacker performs all actions on his own, independently
and without the help of other entities. Furthermore, he does not create any
additional accounts but conducts the attack with one single digital identity.
– Multiple identities: In online environments, which are mostly anonymous,
pseudonyms can generally be created with minimal costs. Hence, a malicious
entity may easily acquire multiple digital identities with which he is able to
create pseudo-referrals and boost his reputation in the system.
– Multiple entities: A group of attackers agrees to perform a joint attack.
Typically, the damage caused by multiple colluding entities is considerably
higher than by entities independently performing malicious actions.
Behavior The behavior dimension characterizes the actions of an attacker.
Here, we differentiate attackers acting maliciously all the time from attackers
alternating between malicious and honest actions.
– Consistent: Attackers act maliciously all the time and do not perform any
honest actions.
– Inconsistent: Attackers perform both honest and dishonest actions. Thus,
the dishonest actions can be used to gain higher profits, for instance, while
the honest actions ensure that the reputation value is kept at a level that
makes other users assess the attacker as honest.
4 Introducing an Attack View on the Component
Repository
In this section, we show how we implemented the novel “attack view” on the
component repository. Thereto, we firstly accomplish the assignment of attack
classes and defense components. Secondly, we delineate how the taxonomy of
attacks was integrated as part of the knowledge repository and linked to the
computation components.
4.1 Assignment of Defense Components
Most research papers on defense mechanisms against attacks in TRS propose a
variety of possible solutions in form of “unstructured” textual recommendations.
In this work, in contrast, we assign reusable components. These components
are not only implemented in a web-service but also clearly described in well-
structured design pattern-like artifacts. In this way, a developer can directly
make use of both the ideas and the web-services that can be integrated in existing
reputation systems to extend their capabilities.
To accomplish the assignment, we analyzed the single classes of our tax-
onomy of attacks on TRS in electronic marketplaces introduced in the former
section with regard to their general characteristics. Table 1 shows an excerpt
of the results. The terms listed on the right side of the table reflect the unique
component terms as used in the component repository. These components pro-
vide a range of different defense approaches that can be applied either alone or
in combination.
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Table 1. Excerpt of assignment table
Primary
class
Secondary class Tertiary
class
Component
seller
consistent Summation, Bayesian Probability, Average, Share
(positive)
one identity inconsistent Asymetric rating, Absolute time discounting, Relative
time discounting, Age-based filter, Context similarity,
Criteria similarity
... ... ... ...
advisor multiple identities
consistent Clustering filter, Subjective reliability
inconsistent Absolute time discounting, Beta-statistic filter, Clus-
tering filter, Propagation discount, Relative time dis-
counting, Subjective reliability
4.2 Implementation as Part of the Knowledge Repository
In the second step, we implemented the taxonomy of attacks as part of the
knowledge repository2.
Table 2. Example profile of one attack class, shortened
Attack Classes Advisor attack: consistent (One identity)
Description In a consistent advisor attack carried out by one identity, a single advisor
consistently assigns deceptive ratings to transactions. This means consis-
tently providing unfairly low ratings to honest sellers and/or consistently
providing unfairly high ratings to dishonest sellers.
Examples - Consistent ballot stuffing: The attacker provides unfairly high ratings
toward other actors to increase their reputation.
- Consistent bad mouthing: The attacker provides unfairly low ratings
toward other actors to discourage their reputation. [...]
Solution There are several ways to filter out unfair ratings made by single attackers.
Detection/filtering mechanisms can broadly be divided into two groups:
endogenous filtering/discounting and exogenous filtering/discounting. En-
dogenous discounting methods try to detect unfair ratings on the basis of
their statistical properties. [...]
Pattern/web-service
– Beta-statistic filter
– Clustering filter
– Objective reliability (reputation) [...]
Literature
– Tavakolifard, M., Almeroth, K. A Taxonomy to Express Open Chal-
lenges in Trust and Reputation Systems. Journal of Communications,
North America, 7, 7. 2012. [...]
2 http://trust.bayforsec.de/ngot/index.php?section=knowledge repository
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To give a more detailed view on the single classes as well as the possible de-
fense strategies, we described each block in a clearly structured “profile”. Each
profile contains a general description for that block, a number of example attacks,
a solution (defense strategy) to that problem, hyperlinks to design patterns/web-
services that can be used to implement the solution, and a list of relevant litera-
ture. All these profiles can be found online as part of the knowledge repository.
Table 2 depicts an example profile for a consistent advisor attack based on one
identity.
5 Discussion
Reviewing the assignment of our taxonomy of attacks and defense mechanisms,
we made some interesting findings. In contrast to most surveys on attacks and
defense mechanisms for TRS, we did not introduce a range of different attacks in
this work but rather focused on the general characteristics and symptomatology
of attacks such as the continuity and the number of attackers. We thereby found
that many attacks that have been described as distinct challenges in literature
are actually different manifestations of the same symptomatology. Consequently,
defense mechanisms against specific characteristics of attacks may help to cover
a variety of challenges.
Overall, the assignment of attack classes and computation components brings
some valuable benefits:
– Developers not only gain solutions to challenges stemming from weaknesses
against attacks in form of a short recommendation but find a clearly struc-
tured design pattern-like description of the exact problem, a solution to that
problem, a generic code example and further literature. Moreover, they can
directly make use of a web-service implementing that logic.
– Having a range of already implemented services, developers can experiment
with different combinations of components to find the best solution for their
specific problem, TRS and use case.
– Researchers are encouraged to use this clearly defined structure when devel-
oping new ideas and defense mechanisms, and make them available in form
of both design patterns and web-services in the component repository.
6 Conclusion
Lots of research on attacks and defense strategies on TRS has been done in
the past. In this paper we developed a novel taxonomy which, to the best of
our knowledge, is the first taxonomy that can be used to describe all attacks
that focus on the manipulation or exploitation of the reputation computation in
e-commerce settings. We then identified defense mechanisms for different types
of attacks by mapping reusable TRS components against classes of attacks. In
this way, we not only support reputation system designers in the development
of more reliable and robust TRS with already existing components but also help
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to identity weaknesses that have not been addressed so far. Furthermore, our
taxonomy is valuable for future research in that it provides a basis to describe
attacks by their characteristics and symptomatology and contributes to a com-
mon understanding of attacks on TRS.
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